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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The jurisprudence that has developed in the last twenty-five years under 
Batson v. Kentucky may be fairly described as indeterminate, unprincipled, 
and generally ineffective.1 Scholarly literature points to a variety of reasons 
for this state of affairs.2 This Article focuses on one source of the problem—
the lack of clarity in the law concerning the evidentiary framework 
(methodology) needed for a reliable analysis of statistical evidence in Batson 
cases. United States Supreme Court decisions beginning with Miller-El v. 
Cockrell (2003) and continuing through Miller-El v. Dretke (2005), Johnson v. 
California (2005), and Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) clarified a number of issues 
related to the use of statistical evidence and laid the foundation for the 
development of a more rigorous and principled methodology for use in 
 
 1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The problems apply equally to the progeny of 
Batson, including Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to strikes exercised 
by defense counsel), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson 
to gender discrimination). A large body of literature concludes that Batson did not eliminate 
the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Leslie 
Ellis & Elisabeth Schmidt, Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 80–83 (1997) (collecting articles raising this concern); Nancy S. Marder, 
Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1122–23 
(1995) (noting that prosecutors offer “irrational” reasons to justify discriminatory strikes and 
judges often accept these reasons); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned 
About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996) (analyzing the 
implementation of Batson in federal and state courts between 1986 and 1993 and concluding 
that it had not eliminated discrimination); Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to 
Jurors’ Views Regarding the Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1061, 1062–65 (2003) 
(discussing articles that report continuing discrimination); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. 
Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use 
and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007) (reporting the findings of 
experimental research testing and challenging the presumptions underlying Batson). 
 2. In his concurrence to Batson, Justice Marshall pointed out that Batson claims would be 
difficult to state and equally difficult to evaluate. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–06 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). Scholars also have noted that the Court’s failure to provide guidance for the 
judicial review of Batson claims leads to inconsistent standards across jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 476 
(1998) (noting that the Court was “short on the details of proper behavior and ambiguous with 
respect to the nature of the wrong it was redressing”); Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the 
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1707–08 (2006) (noting the 
problem of inconsistencies across jurisdictions); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal To 
Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1105–10 
(1994) (providing examples of lower courts applying Batson inconsistently); Brian J. Serr & 
Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate 
Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 27–28 (1988). Others have noted that the challenge 
of reviewing race-neutral reasons effectively has led to a “charade” where meeting the burden, 
and defeating the Batson claim, requires little effort. Marder, supra, at 1706 (“Batson is so easy to 
circumvent that it allows a charade in the courtroom.”); see also Jere W. Morehead, When a 
Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious 
Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 634 (1994) (explaining that 
evidentiary requirements protect most attorneys from a finding of unacceptable peremptory 
challenges). 
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Batson cases.3 In that regard, this line of cases may be usefully compared to 
the Supreme Court’s Title VII decisions in the 1970s, which laid the 
foundation for the development of an exhaustive body of evidentiary and 
methodological law that informs the use of statistical evidence in 
employment cases.4 
In this Article, we first consider the issues, rulings, and likely impact of 
the Miller-El line of cases. We then discuss research developed in connection 
with a recent capital case with complicated Batson issues to both illustrate 
and build on that foundation in an effort to provide useful guidance for 
future policymakers and litigants.5 
In the next part, Part II, we provide background information on Batson 
and the evidentiary issues this paper seeks to address. Part III then 
introduces the Supreme Court cases that form the centerpiece of our 
analysis and considers, again, the contribution these cases make to the 
appropriate use of statistical analysis in Batson claims. This part presents a 
preliminary evaluation of how some courts have applied the Supreme 
Court’s guidance in these areas. Part IV focuses on the case of Commonwealth 
v. Harold Wilson, a capital case from Pennsylvania in which the defendant 
successfully litigated a complex Batson claim using statistical evidence.6 The 
evidence presented in this case can serve as a model of how to present 
statistical evidence of discrimination in jury selection. The conclusion 
appears in Part V. 
 
 3. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 
231 (2005); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 
U.S. 322 (2003). 
 4. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (refining the requirements for admitting results of regression analyses as evidence 
of discrimination); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309–13 (1977) 
(providing guidance on the use of statistical evidence in proving a pattern or practice of 
employment discrimination); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 
(1977) (“[O]ur cases make it unmistakably clear that ‘[s]tatistical analyses have served and will 
continue to serve an important role’ in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a 
disputed issue. We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof, where it reached 
proportions comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination in jury selection cases[.] Statistics are equally competent in proving employment 
discrimination.” (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mayor of Phila. v. 
Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974))). 
 5. We note the decisions of the Louisville courts to prepare and maintain complete 
documentation on the exercise of peremptory challenges and other aspects of jury selection, 
Melynda J. Price, Policing the Borders of Democracy: The Continuing Role of Batson in Protecting the 
Citizenship Rights of the Excluded, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1635 (2012), and the recommendation of 
Alafair Burke in her paper in this symposium issue, Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (2012), that prosecutors voluntarily develop and monitor data records of 
jury selections. This Article may also be of assistance in considering the design of any such 
efforts.  
 6. Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, 672 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1996). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This section introduces the evidentiary frameworks contemplated by 
Batson and identifies key disparate treatment issues that have emerged in the 
application of Batson. 
A.  THE BATSON EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK 
Batson contemplates a three-stage analysis for the proof and defense of 
claims of purposeful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. In 
stage one, the defendant carries the burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination.7 In stage two, the prosecution carries a burden of 
producing evidence that shows each challenged strike had a legitimate basis, 
meaning that the jurors were not struck on account of their race or gender.8 
In stage three, the defendant carries the burden of proving that the 
explanations offered by the prosecution with respect to one or more venire 
members were pretextual, thereby supporting an inference that one or more 
strikes were racially motivated.9 
The discrimination at issue in a Batson case is purposeful, intentional 
discrimination, which the Supreme Court characterizes as “disparate 
treatment” discrimination.10 Disparate treatment claims apply when 
circumstances give the decision maker ample room for the exercise of 
discretion—a characterization that perfectly fits the use of peremptory 
challenges. The basic strategy in proving disparate treatment is to document 
racial disparities that cannot be plausibly explained by race-neutral 
characteristics of the protected group, individual, or individuals adversely 
affected by the challenged decision or decisions.11 
 
 7. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97. Batson eliminated the presumption that prosecutors acted 
with nondiscriminatory purpose in striking jurors and the requirement that defendants prove 
that prosecutors systemically discriminated in case after case. Those requirements, it said, had 
created a “crippling burden of proof” that left peremptory strikes “largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 92–93. Instead, the Court held that “the defendant is entitled to 
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a 
jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’” 
Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). It further held that a 
demonstrated “‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire” can be 
sufficient to create an inference of discrimination. Id. at 97. 
 8. Id. at 97–98. As a prerequisite to rebutting the inference of discrimination, step two of 
the Batson inquiry requires “the prosecutor [to] give a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ 
explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting 
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). In doing so, Batson 
conformed jury discrimination claims with the standards of proof applied in other disparate 
treatment claims under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 9. Id. at 98. 
 10. Id. at 94 n.18. 
 11. Disparate treatment discrimination stands in contrast to disparate impact 
discrimination, which is based on a finding that the nondiscretionary application of a facially 
neutral rule by a decision maker has had an adverse impact on a protected group. 1 BARBARA T. 
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B.  DISPARATE TREATMENT ISSUES IN THE BATSON EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK 
Batson jurisprudence incorporated into the evidentiary framework two 
models of proof that have developed since the 1970s under both Title VII 
and equal protection law.12 The first is the individual disparate treatment 
model,13 and the second is the pattern-and-practice model.14 
Under Title VII, an individual disparate treatment theory alleges 
discrimination in a single case typically without regard to the employer’s 
treatment of other employees or job applicants.15 In the employment 
context, the individual establishes a prima facie case with proof that the 
claimant is a member of a protected group, was qualified for the job, was 
rejected, and the job remained open.16 With this established, the burden of 
production shifts to the defendant to show the claimant’s lack of 
qualification for the job.17 If the employer makes this showing, the claimant 
carries the burden of proving that the reasons offered to explain the 
 
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 109–10 (C. Geoffrey 
Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (contrasting disparate treatment and disparate impact claims). 
A good example of such discrimination is the use of height and weight standards in hiring fire 
fighters or corrections officers. Because men and women on average differ on these 
dimensions, the evenhanded application of such standards adversely affects women as a group. 
See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (deciding against a female applicant for a 
corrections officer position who brought a disparate impact claim based in part on height and 
weight requirements). 
 12. However, neither Batson nor the case law that evolved before Miller-El adequately 
explained the applicability of the two models. Indeed, in Batson, Justice Powell notes with 
seeming pride that “we make no attempt to instruct [our federal and state] courts how best to 
implement our holding today.” 476 U.S. at 99–100 n.24. At another point, he states that the 
Court has “confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to 
decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges create a 
prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.” Id. at 97. The experience of the next 
twenty-five years demonstrates that this confidence was badly misplaced. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 95–96 (noting that persuasive direct 
evidence of a defendant’s discriminatory intent can support a claim independent of pattern-
and-practice type evidence). 
 14. Id. at 104–07 (describing the elements of a pattern-and-practice claim).  
 15. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (explaining the 
pleading of an individual plaintiff). In some instances, pattern or practice evidence may be 
relevant to individual disparate treatment claims. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 
82–83 (collecting cases). This theory of liability has had the effect in the Batson jurisprudence 
of diminishing the relevance of “pattern or practice” evidence in Batson cases. 
 16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the 
elements of a prima facie claim); see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 16 
(stating the elements of a prima facie case and citing cases for authority). 
 17. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, 
at 16. 
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rejection were pretextual and the decision was a product of purposeful 
discrimination.18 
Because the analysis in an individual disparate treatment case is based 
on the facts of only a single case, the practical burden of proof on claimants 
in the employment context is extremely heavy, and, as a result, these 
claimants are rarely successful. Some have made similar efforts to reduce the 
Batson analysis to a series of individual disparate treatment cases, i.e., one 
such analysis for each venire member, with each defendant limited strictly to 
the facts of his or her case.19 Proponents of this shift point out that if the 
bottom line at stage three of the evidentiary framework turns on an 
individualized analysis of each venire member and focuses strictly on the 
credibility of the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reasons, then courts should 
default directly to that inquiry. Under this default approach, the pattern-
and-practice evidence and any inferences they support drop out of the case 
and are essentially deemed irrelevant to pretext decisions made during stage 
three. Miller-El squarely rejected this approach to Batson claims.20 In contrast, 
recent Supreme Court decisions relied heavily on the pattern-and-practice 
framework. 
The factual issue in a pattern-and-practice case is whether the 
defendant applied a policy of purposeful discrimination against protected 
group members in a series of discretionary decisions.21 Pattern-and-practice 
claims under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause may be proven by 
direct or circumstantial evidence.22 In the absence of direct evidence, 
statistical evidence is the most probative form of circumstantial evidence. 
Under the leadership of the Supreme Court, the federal courts have 
developed a detailed body of law that regulates the methodology applied in 
Title VII and equal protection cases.23 
 
 18. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, 
at 16. 
 19. A footnote in Batson is consistent with this approach. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
96 n.19 (1986) (“[A] person claiming that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination 
may make out a prima facie case by relying solely on the facts concerning the alleged 
discrimination against him.”). 
 20. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 340–41 (2003).  
 21. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 204–06. The claim alleges that some, 
but not all, of the adversely affected protected group members were adversely treated because 
of their race. Id. 
 22. Id. at 10 (“Discriminatory intent can be shown through direct or circumstantial 
evidence.”). 
 23. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(refining the requirements for admitting results of regression analyses as evidence of 
discrimination); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309–13 (1977) 
(providing guidance on the use of statistical evidence in proving a pattern or practice of 
employment discrimination); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 
(1977) (“[O]ur cases make it unmistakably clear that ‘[s]tatistical analyses have served and will 
continue to serve an important role’ in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a 
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Before Batson, under Swain v. Alabama, litigants used the pattern-and-
practice model to challenge the use of peremptory strikes.24 Indeed, Swain 
required a strong showing of a pattern and practice of discrimination in other 
cases tried by the defendant’s prosecutor, in addition to a showing of 
discriminatory strikes in the defendant’s own case.25 However, because of 
the difficulty of developing the data required to mount a Swain challenge, 
and the heavy burden of proof carried by the defendant claimant in such 
cases,26 very little evidentiary law developed under Swain.27 
A key concern under Batson has been the failure of the courts to 
identify and apply the essential features of the pattern-and-practice model 
evidentiary framework. The Supreme Court has provided very little guidance 
in this area. The employment discrimination model suggests the following 
considerations are particularly germane when preparing statistical evidence 
that speaks precisely to the risk of discrimination in a particular case. First, a 
study design should follow the rule of relevancy, defined as limiting the 
analysis to information with the capacity to enhance or diminish an 
inference that race was a motivating factor in one or more prosecutorial 
strikes against black venire members.28 Considerations of relevancy should 
control the scope of the study. Second, the study should seek to include data 
on a representative sample of relevant cases.29 Third, the study should 
present as precise measures of the practical and statistical significance of the 
race of venire member disparities in the individual and in other cases 
 
disputed issue. We have repeatedly approved the use of statistical proof, where it reached 
proportions comparable to those in this case, to establish a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination in jury selection cases[.] Statistics are equally competent in proving employment 
discrimination.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mayor of Phila. v. 
Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974))). See generally DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. 
COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11 
(reviewing and providing detailed guidance on employment discrimination law). 
 24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222–27 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash 
Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 345–46, 345 n.42 (1982) 
(noting the high bar set by Swain and collecting cases in which defendants failed to meet the 
test); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 240 (1986) (same). 
 27. Gurney, supra note 26, at 241–43 (discussing a conflict among circuit courts about 
how to apply Swain in light of subsequent case law). 
 28. 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 2286 (“[T]he statistical pool or sample 
used must logically be related to the employment decision at issue . . . .” (quoting Jones v. Pepsi-
Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 871 F. Supp. 305, 310 (E.D. Mich. 1994))). Note: Throughout this 
paper we refer to black venire members as examples because strikes against black venire 
members were at issue in Miller-El, Johnson, and Snyder, and are most frequently the subject of a 
Batson claim.  
 29. Id. 
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included in the analysis as possible.30 This should include an evaluation of 
rival hypotheses including chance and missing information.31 Finally, the 
study should seek to include valid and complete data on all relevant 
variables. This is, of course, often easier said than done. 
Courts often lose track of relevancy concerns in Batson analyses. One of 
the most common practices is to contrast the number or proportion of 
blacks on the venire with the number and proportion on the jury.32 This 
overall impact analysis is not consistent with the rule of relevancy because it 
embraces the impact of challenges for cause, hardship strikes, and the 
opposing party’s peremptory strikes. The approach is understandably 
animated by an interest in the extent to which the use of peremptories by 
both sides reduces the representation of blacks on the jury below what one 
would expect to see in a voir dire that was evenhanded on both sides. 
Because this consideration bears on a defendant’s right to a fair trial, 
particularly when the defendant is black, this is an understandable interest. 
In the view of the Supreme Court, however, it is not the controlling interest. 
The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the principal purpose of 
Batson and its progeny is to protect venire members from race and gender 
discrimination.33 Concerns about the impact of the use of peremptories on a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial of his or her racial peers is secondary.34 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Grice, 335 Fed. App’x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2009); McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 
1252, 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009); Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 98–100 (2d Cir. 2009); Paulino 
v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2008); Franklin v. Sims, 538 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 
2008); Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 168, 183 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ervin, 266 Fed. 
App’x 428, 431–32 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hendrix, 509 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 
2007); Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 576–77 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Abdush-
Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 468 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1205 
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1045–46, 1046 n.42 (11th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 512–14 (7th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Bartley, 
No. 07 C 1975, 2008 WL 4866169, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bennet v. 
Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2010); People v. Ross, No. E038158, 2006 WL 3734965, at *4, *6 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006). 
 33. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) (“We have recognized that 
whether the trial is criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal 
protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored group 
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.”); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 
505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991); Powers 
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991). 
 34. A party’s conduct with respect to seeking or opposing excusals for cause may 
constitute circumstantial evidence in support of a Batson claim. See, for example, the disparate 
question allegations in Miller-El. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 255 (2005) 
(“Some of these prefatory statements were cast in general terms, but some followed the so-
called graphic script, describing the method of execution in rhetorical and clinical detail. It is 
intended, Miller-El contends, to prompt some expression of hesitation to consider the death 
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A related area concerns the appropriate scope for the universe of cases 
and venire members to which the pattern-and-practice model of proof 
should or may be applied. In other words, is the use of peremptories in 
other cases tried by the defendant’s prosecutor a “relevant circumstance” 
within the meaning of Batson?35 As noted above, Swain required the 
defendant to prove a pattern and practice of discrimination in other cases 
tried by his prosecutor.36 Since Batson, some courts have ruled that the only 
relevant strikes under Batson are those against black venire members in the 
defendant’s own case.37 An even broader question under the pattern-and-
practice model is whether and in what circumstances courts may consider 
cases tried by other prosecutors serving in the office that prosecuted the 
defendant’s case. 
With respect to measures of the practical and statistical significance of 
evidence of discrimination, courts often fail to apply measures of the 
treatment of both the protected and majority group members in a manner 
that documents a disparity between the “actual” treatment of the protected 
group and the treatment of the protected group that one would “expect” to 
see in an evenhanded decision making process.38 This essential detail was 
omitted from Batson39 and only a handful of pre-Miller-El courts recognized 
its importance.40 The Wilson case, discussed below, shows how this kind of 
partial look at statistics can mask significant discrimination.41 
 
penalty and thus to elicit plausibly neutral grounds for a peremptory strike of a potential juror 
subjected to it, if not a strike for cause.”). 
 35. In his discussion of the prima facie case, Justice Powell states that the defendant “must 
show” that the prosecutor’s strikes in the defendant’s case “and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference” that prosecutorial strikes in his case were racially motivated. 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). 
 36. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 37. See, e.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Grice, 335 Fed. 
App’x at 928–29; Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 796 (5th Cir. 2008); Nelson, 450 F.3d at 1207–08; Ross, 2006 WL 
3734965, at *6. 
 38. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 136–37 & n.109 (reporting that 
courts evaluating employment discrimination claims typically “compare the selection (or pass) 
rate of the protected group with that of its preferred counterpart,” and collecting cases). 
 39. Batson suggested that discrimination may be established on a showing that the 
“prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the 
defendant’s race.” 476 U.S. at 96. An example of such conduct could be a “‘pattern’ of strikes 
against black jurors” in the venire. Id. at 97. Although Batson never overtly referenced 
comparative analysis, its relevance is implicit from references in Justice Powell’s opinion to 
earlier cases involving discrimination in the selection of venire, as contrasted to juries, in which 
he uses such terms as “disproportionate impact” and “exclusion,” and “substantially 
underrepresented.” Id. at 93, 95. 
 40. The consequences of Justice Powell’s imprecision, and the Court’s failure to clarify the 
requirements of proof until 2003, is reflected in the results of an empirical study by Kenneth J. 
Melilli. See generally Melilli, supra note 1. For example, Melilli analyzed the methodology used in 
determining the existence of a prima facie case in 585 Batson cases between 1986 and 1993. Id. 
at 471–73 & tbls.G-1 & G-2. In these 585 cases, he documented the use of eight quantitative 
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Another recurrent issue concerns the methods for evaluating the 
plausibility of the rival hypothesis that any documented race disparities in 
the prosecutor’s use of peremptories are the product of chance or the 
impact of racially neutral factors.42 A number of cases, including Batson, have 
alluded to this chance–rival hypothesis, but few, if any, have formally tested 
its plausibility with a measure of statistical significance.43 
III.  FROM MILLER-EL I THROUGH SNYDER 
The line of cases that provides the centerpiece of this Article began with 
the case of Thomas Joe Miller-El. Although the procedural history of the 
case is complex and long—Miller-El’s Batson claim was eventually considered 
by a total of eleven courts over the course of nineteen years44—the outcome 
of Miller-El’s voir dire and trial was straightforward and fairly typical. Miller-
El, an African American, was convicted in 1986 of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death by a Texas jury with a single black member.45 Miller-El 
challenged the seating of the jury on the grounds that the prosecution 
violated Swain46 in its discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges.47 
The trial court denied the motion and subsequently denied the claim again 
 
methods. Id. Only one of these methods, appearing in 34 cases (6%), relied on a comparison of 
strike rates for the protected and majority venire members. Id. at 471–73, 478. More recent 
surveys of Batson methodology are to the same effect. David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory 
Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001) 
(studying the role of race in peremptory challenges in Philadelphia); Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. 
Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net To Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully 
Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (2011) (studying Batson claims in federal cases 
between 2000 and 2009). 
 41. See infra text accompanying note 130. 
 42. In the employment context, a prima facie case is established with a model of statistical 
proof of practically significant disparity that discounts the rival hypothesis of chance and, 
depending on the nature of the job, the rival hypothesis that the race disparity is the product of 
race-neutral factors. In rebuttal, the defendant seeks to rebut the disparity by establishing the 
plausibility of the chance or race-neutral factor hypotheses as its source. If the rebuttal fails, the 
court will find that a pattern and practice of discrimination has been established. When this 
occurs, the case moves to a remedial stage in which each adversely affected protected-class 
member is entitled to relief unless the employer can prove that the decision in his or her case 
was based on a race-neutral factor. 
 43. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.  
 44. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 236–37 (2005) (laying out the 
procedural history of the case).  
 45. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 326, 328 (2003). The defendant was 
convicted of killing one person in the course of a robbery, id., and the death sentence was 
imposed by the court on the strength of a jury finding that he would be a continuing threat to 
society if permitted to live. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Miller-El II, 545 U.S. 231 (No. 
03-9659); see also Joint Appendix, Vol. II Miller-El II, 545 U.S. 231 (No. 03-9659), 2004 WL 
2892870 at *1018, *1036. 
 46. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 47. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 328. 
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under the newly imposed Batson framework.48 Thus began the case that 
eventually persuaded the Supreme Court to provide additional guidance on 
the Batson framework. 
A.  THE MANY CASES OF THOMAS JOE MILLER-EL 
During voir dire at Miller-El’s trial, the prosecution peremptorily struck 
91% (10/11) of the black venire members but only 13% (4/31) of the 
white venire members.49 Miller-El’s Batson claim focused on six of the ten 
black venire members struck by the prosecution.50 
There was also evidence of racially stratified disparities in prosecutorial 
questioning of venire members that appeared to put blacks at greater risk 
than whites of being struck for cause. Specifically, as a predicate to questions 
about venire member attitudes about the death penalty, 53% (8/15) of the 
black versus 6% (3/49) of the white venire members were given a “graphic 
description” of how death sentenced prisoners were executed in Texas,51 
which was likely to enhance a typical venire member’s reservations about the 
morality of capital punishment.52 
In addition, as a predicate to a question about the juror’s potential 
willingness to follow the law and impose a minimum sentence—if that is 
what the jury believed was required by the facts of the case—the prosecution 
gave 94% of the white venire members information on Texas sentencing law 
that would increase their chances of answering this question correctly, while 
only 12% (1/8) of the black venire members were given this information.53 
Additional evidence showed that in Miller-El’s voir dire, the prosecution 
used a procedure, known as the jury shuffle,54 to rearrange the order in 
which venire members in the courtroom were considered for strikes by each 
side in a manner that reduced the number of black venire members who 
would be considered before the final jury was agreed upon.55 The Court 
 
 48. Id. at 329. 
 49. Id. at 331. 
 50. Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 332 (majority opinion). 
 52. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 260 (2005) (rejecting the state’s 
alternate explanation for the use of the graphic script and concluding that “if we posit instead 
that the prosecutors’ first object was to use the graphic script to make a case for excluding black 
panel members opposed to or ambivalent about the death penalty, there is a much tighter fit of 
fact and explanation”). 
 53. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 332–33. The State eventually “concede[d] that the manipulative 
minimum punishment questioning was used to create cause to strike.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 
261 (citing Brief of Respondent at 33 & n.26, Miller-El II, 545 U.S. 231 (No. 03-9659)).  
 54. In Texas criminal cases, “either side may literally reshuffle the cards bearing panel 
members’ names, thus rearranging the order in which members of a venire panel are seated 
and reached for questioning.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 253. 
 55. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 333–34. There was also evidence that the prosecutors recorded 
the race of each venire member in their records. Id. at 347. 
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found that while there “might be” racially neutral reasons to shuffle the jury, 
the State offered none and “nothing stop[ped] the suspicion of 
discriminatory intent from rising to an inference.”56 
The record also included “extensive evidence” of race discrimination in 
the use of peremptories by the District Attorney’s Office, whose tenure 
(1951–1987) embraced the Miller-El prosecution.57 The first type of 
evidence in this regard was testimony of current and former prosecutors and 
judges who had firsthand knowledge of the office and believed that “the 
office had a systematic policy of excluding African-Americans from juries.”58 
The second type of evidence, which the court considered to be of “more 
importance,” included a “formal policy” from the 1960s and a “Jury 
Selection” manual for criminal cases written in 1968, which “outlin[ed] the 
reasoning for excluding minorities from jury service.”59 The manual 
remained in circulation until 1976 and was available to at least one of the 
Miller-El prosecutors.60 The State argued that the policies in the manual had 
been discontinued before Miller-El’s trial, but other evidence stated they 
existed as late as 1985, and the record contained an admission of a 
prosecutor that he had once used the jury shuffle to reduce the number of 
blacks in the venire.61 
In rebuttal, the State offered one or more of the following as race-
neutral reasons for the six prosecutorial strikes at issue: “ambivalence about 
the death penalty; hesitancy to vote to execute defendants capable of being 
rehabilitated; and the juror’s own family history of criminality.”62 
The lower courts uniformly denied Miller-El relief on his Batson claim, 
starting with a 1988 remand of his case from his direct appeal for 
consideration of his claim in “light of Batson,” which had recently been 
 
 56. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 254–55. 
 57. The extensive evidence was offered in a pre-trial Swain hearing, as Batson had not been 
decided at the time of Miller-El’s trial. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 328, 334.  
 58. Id. at 334. 
 59. Id. at 334–35. 
 60. Id. at 335. 
 61. The record contained two further items of evidence that were not referred to in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. The record contained two empirical studies of voir dire conducted 
by a local newspaper covering periods close in time to the defendant’s trial (1980–1986, 1982–
1984) that showed strong race disparities in the prosecutorial use of peremptories. See Steve 
McGonigle & Ed Timms, Race Bias Pervades Jury Selection: Prosecutors Routinely Bar Blacks, Study 
Finds [Part 1 of 2], DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1986, at 1A, available at 1986 WLNR 1683009; 
Ed Timms & Steve McGonigle, A Pattern of Exclusion: Blacks Rejected from Juries in Capital Cases, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 21, 1986, at 1A, available at 1986 WLNR 1716765; see also Miller-El 
II, 545 U.S. at 275–76 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that Miller-El presented “excerpts from 
a series of newspaper articles”). The newspaper articles appear in Volume II of the Joint 
Appendix. Joint Appendix, Vol. II, Miller-El II, 545 U.S. 231 (No. 03-9659), 2004 WL 2891870 
at *1018, *1036. There was also evidence of race disparities and Batson violations in other cases 
tried by the prosecutors in Miller-El’s case. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 334.  
 62. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 343. 
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decided.63 In Miller-El I, the Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a 
certificate of appealability (“COA”) and held that the COA should have 
issued.64 Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit granted the COA and rejected 
Miller-El’s Batson claim on the merits.65 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review this decision and reversed, ordering relief.66 
B.  CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE ANALYTICAL MODEL: JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA 
(2005) & SNYDER V. LOUISIANA (2008) 
In the years following Miller-El II, the Supreme Court issued two more 
decisions clarifying the Batson framework and the underlying evidentiary 
law.67 Both cases involved capital murder trials.68 The first case was Johnson v. 
California.69 During voir dire at Johnson’s trial, the prosecution used three of 
twelve peremptory challenges to remove all three eligible black prospective 
jurors, resulting in an all-white jury.70 The trial court denied both of 
Johnson’s Batson claims largely without input from the prosecution.71 The 
California Supreme Court ultimately agreed that the defendant had not 
established a prima facie case,72 holding that Johnson had failed to present 
 
 63. Id. at 329. Batson was decided during Miller-El’s direct appeal. The appellate court 
held that his evidence “established an inference of purposeful discrimination.” Id. The state 
trial court ruled that the evidence failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and 
even if it did, the “prosecutors had offered credible, race-neutral explanations for each African-
American excluded.” Id. The state trial court rejected Miller-El’s Batson claim in state post-
conviction proceedings; the state supreme court affirmed the decision on appeal. Id. In federal 
court, the magistrate judge expressed concern about the evidence but accepted the 
“prosecutors’ race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors” and recommended 
dismissal of Miller-El’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 329–30. The district court 
adopted the magistrate’s report and dismissed the petition. Id. at 330. Thereupon, Miller-El 
unsuccessfully sought a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in the district court and that denial 
was affirmed in the Fifth Circuit on the ground that he “failed to make a substantial showing of 
the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2001), 
rev’d sub nom. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. 322. 
 64. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 326–27. The Supreme Court found that the Fifth Circuit 
applied an unduly conservative standard in evaluating the COA petition and that the COA 
should have issued because the question of race discrimination in the exercise of peremptories 
in the case was “debatable.” Id. at 343. 
 65. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 237. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005). 
 68. Snyder, 552 U.S. 472 (stating that the defendant received a death sentence for 
attacking his estranged wife and her companion with a knife, killing the companion); Johnson, 
545 U.S. 162 (stating that the defendant received a death sentence for second-degree murder 
and assault on a 19-month-old child). 
 69. Johnson, 545 U.S. 162. 
 70. Id. at 164–65. 
 71. Id. at 165. 
 72. Id. at 166–68. 
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“‘strong evidence’ that makes discriminatory intent more likely than not.”73 
The United States Supreme Court rejected this standard of proof for stating 
a prima facie case under Batson, holding that a Batson claimant must only 
“produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference 
that discrimination has occurred” and found the evidence in the case 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson.74 
The second case, Snyder v. Louisiana, was tried in Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana, before an all-white jury.75 The prosecution struck all five qualified 
black jurors, reducing the representation rate of black jurors in the jury pool 
from 14% (5/36) to 0% (0/12).76 A split panel of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court denied Snyder’s Batson claim on direct appeal and on remand from 
the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Miller-El II.77 
The Supreme Court conducted detailed analysis of the prosecution’s strike 
against one black juror, finding the proffered reasons implausible and 
conducting a comparative analysis of the failure to strike comparable white 
jurors.78 The Court then ruled on the merits in favor of the defendant, 
finding that the exercise of peremptory strikes violated Batson.79 
C.  THE EMERGENT ANALYTIC MODEL 
As noted above, the central question for this Article concerns the extent 
to which the Miller-El line of cases clarifies the evidentiary framework or 
methodology required for a reliable analysis of statistical evidence in Batson 
cases. In these cases, the Court again cited to Title VII authority by 
comparison, but did not expressly adopt all aspects of that model.80 
Nonetheless, the Court’s reliance highlights the commonly overlooked point 
that nearly all of the methodological issues in Batson cases have counterparts 
in Title VII cases, particularly the pattern-and-practice jurisprudence. A 
 
 73. Id. at 167 (citing People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 278 (Cal. 2003), dismissed sub nom. 
Johnson v. California, 541 U.S. 428 (2004), and rev’d sub nom. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 
162 (2005)). 
 74. Id. at 170. 
 75. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 475–76. Snyder also presented evidence that the prosecutor improperly referred 
to the case as his “O.J. Simpson case” and suggested to the jury that Snyder’s case resembled 
Simpson’s, but Simpson “got away [with] it.” Joint Appendix Vol. II, Snyder, 552 U.S. 472 (No. 
06-10119), 2007 WL 2685159, at *606–07. 
 77. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476. 
 78. Id. at 479–86. 
 79. Id. at 486. The Court did not analyze the importance of the references to O.J. 
Simpson’s case to an inference of discriminatory intent.  
 80. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 
(1993)); Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 n.7 (2005) (citing several Title VII cases, 
including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); Miller-El v. Cockrell 
(Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 340–41 (2003) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133 (2000)). 
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proper understanding of this point may point state and federal courts in the 
right direction when they confront Batson pattern-and-practice issues. 
The most significant ruling in Miller-El I holds that “the facts and 
circumstances that [are] adduced in support of the prima facie case” of 
pattern-and-practice disparate treatment are also relevant to the defendant’s 
pretext claim in stage three of the Batson evidentiary framework to the effect 
that “despite the neutral explanation of the prosecution, the peremptory 
strikes in the final analysis were race based.”81 This ruling is a clear 
repudiation of the position that the Batson evidentiary framework should be 
viewed as a series of independent freestanding disparate treatment cases for 
each protected-class venire member struck by the prosecution, without 
regard for the pattern-and-practice evidence in the case.82 The Court 
reiterated this holding in Miller-El II, emphasizing its importance.83 This 
holding has particular implications in light of the use of comparative juror 
analyses in stage three. A comparative juror analysis necessarily focuses on 
the treatment of an individual venire member. Indeed, finding 
discrimination with respect to a single venire member is sufficient to find a 
violation.84 Yet, the comparative analysis should be framed by all of the 
evidence before the court, including statistical pattern-and-practice 
evidence.85 
In addition, Miller-El I holds that the test at stage three is not whether 
race was the sole motivating factor but rather whether it was a contributing 
factor in one or more of the prosecutorial decisions to strike at least one 
 
 81. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. 133). The government conceded 
that a prima facie case had been established. Id. at 338.  
 82. The court properly conducted a similar comparative analysis of the prosecution’s 
differential questioning strategies that were allegedly designed to make the black venire 
members more vulnerable to strikes for cause. Id. at 332. 
 83. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 252, 265–66 (2005). See also id. at 240 
(“Some stated reasons are false, and although some false reasons are shown up within the four 
corners of a given case, sometimes a court may not be sure unless it looks beyond the case at 
hand. Hence Batson’s explanation that a defendant may rely on ‘all relevant circumstances’ to 
raise an inference of purposeful discrimination.” (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–
97 (1986))). 
 84. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478 (“Because we find that the trial court committed clear error in 
overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to [one venire member], we have no need 
to consider petitioner’s claim regarding [a second venire member].”). 
 85. See, e.g., Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241–42 (incorporating statistical analysis into a 
comparative juror analysis). 
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black venire member.86 This guidance, again following Title VII 
jurisprudence, sharpens the inquiry.87 
Justices Kennedy (in Miller-El I) and Souter (in Miller-El II) relied on the 
wide range of evidence before the Court in Miller-El to discuss or suggest a 
useful hierarchy of classes of evidence.88 The hierarchy itself is of note: the 
highest level of evidence is the numerical disparity in prosecutorial strike 
rates between black and white venire members.89 Indeed, almost every 
Batson case reviewed on appeal starts by presenting these numerical 
disparities.90 The Miller-El line of cases provides some guidance about how to 
measure these disparities. 
This top berth is shared by the side-by-side comparisons of black venire 
members who were struck and white venire members who served on the 
jury—the so-called comparative juror analysis.91 In Miller-El II, a comparative 
juror analysis focused on the striking of black jurors, ostensibly on grounds 
of difficulty imposing the death penalty, while accepting white jurors who 
had expressed similar views.92 In Snyder, a similar analysis compared the 
hardship rational attached to an excused black juror to a similar hardship 
 
 86. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 338–39. In his discussion of the jury shuffle, Justice Kennedy 
stated that “the practice here tends to erode the credibility of the prosecution’s assertion that 
race was not a motivating factor in the jury selection.” Id. at 346. Also, in his discussion of the 
role of nonracial factors, he noted that these factors might have been selectively applied and 
“based on racial considerations.” Id. at 343. The Court reiterated the sufficiency of 
discrimination against any single juror in Snyder. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478. 
 87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”). 
 88. See discussion below for an exploration of the full range of evidence in Miller-El’s 
case. It is not always possible or necessary for a Batson claimant to produce the full range of 
evidence. See, e.g., Snyder, 552 U.S. 472. 
 89. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240–41, 265; Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342. 
 90. See, e.g., Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 605–06 (3d Cir. 2011); Bennett 
v. Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2010); McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 
1266–67 (11th Cir. 2009); Dungen v. Estep, 311 F. App’x 99, 104 (10th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 
West, 555 F.3d 90, 97–99 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 794 (5th Cir. 
2008); Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2008); Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 
272, 287 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Abu-Jamal v. Beard, 129 S. Ct. 1910 (2009); Golphin v. 
Branker, 519 F.3d 168, 180–81 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ervin, 266 F. App’x 428, 431–
32 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hendrix, 509 F.3d 362, 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2007); Aspen v. 
Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 2007); Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 167–68 (2d Cir. 
2007); Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ochoa-
Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1044–46 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 
513 (7th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Bartley, No. 07 C 1975, 2008 WL 4866169, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 
23, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786. 
 91. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240–41. In Miller-El II, Justice Souter began by presenting the 
numerical disparities but then noted the side-by-side comparisons to be “[m]ore powerful than 
these bare statistics.” Id. at 241; see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 475–78 (following a similar pattern). 
 92. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241–48. 
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situation for a seated white juror.93 Next in importance are “broader 
patterns of practice during the jury selection.”94 In Miller-El these included 
the “disparate questioning,” which provided “some evidence of purposeful 
discrimination,”95 and the jury shuffle—a collateral procedural move, which 
“raise[d] a suspicion that the State sought to exclude [black venire 
members] from the jury.”96 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion highlights several important features of the 
kinds of inferential statistical evidence developed in employment 
discrimination cases. Justice Kennedy provides support for the relevance of 
district-wide data to a Batson claim by relying in part on Miller-El’s evidence 
of discrimination in the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office.97 Justice 
Kennedy notes: 
Irrespective of whether the evidence could prove sufficient to 
support a charge of systematic exclusion of African-Americans, it 
reveals that the culture of the District Attorney’s Office in the past 
was suffused with bias against African-Americans in jury selection. 
This evidence, of course, is relevant to the extent it casts doubt on 
the legitimacy of the motives underlying the State’s actions in 
petitioner’s case.98 
Justice Kennedy also models the use of precise measures of strike-rate 
disparities. Perhaps most importantly, he recognizes the importance of a 
“comparative juror analysis” of the numerical disparity in prosecutorial strike 
rates against black venire members to the strike rates against white venire 
members.99 This contrasts sharply with the typical asymmetrical practice 
used by courts when assessing a prima facie case.100 Justice Kennedy directly 
contrasts the 0.91 (10/11) strike rate of the black venire members with the 
 
 93. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478–85. 
 94. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 253. 
 95. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 344; see also Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 255–57. 
 96. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 346; see also Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 253–54, 265–66. 
 97. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 346–47; see also Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 263–64. 
 98. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347. 
 99. See id. at 343 (“[A] comparative juror analysis . . . does make debatable the District 
Court’s conclusion that no purposeful discrimination occurred.”). A strike rate is the number 
of strikes exercised against a particular group of venire members by a particular party divided 
by the total venire members in the group and available for strike by the party.  
 100. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. In Snyder, the Court focused exclusively on 
the fact that all five eligible black jurors were struck by the state. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 
U.S. 472, 475–76 (2008). This means that the prosecution’s strike rate against black venire 
members was 100% (5/5). The Court did not report that the prosecution struck 23% of 
eligible white jurors (7/31), producing a 71-point disparity and a ratio of 3.2. Brief of 
Petitioner at 22–23, Snyder, 552 U.S. 472 (No. 06-10119), 2007 WL 2605447. See also Johnson 
v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 164 (2005) (presenting only prosecutorial strikes against eligible 
black jurors and reporting that the prosecutor’s efforts produced an all-white jury).  
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0.13 (4/31) rate for the white venire members.101 His analysis would have 
gained additional strength had he noted that these statistics document that 
the average black venire member had a 78-percentage point higher chance 
of being struck than did the average white venire member (0.91–0.13), and 
that the prosecutorial strike rate was seven times higher for black than for 
white venire members (0.91/0.13). These measures are a good indication of 
the degree of harm suffered by black venire members individually and as a 
group.102 
In a similar vein, Miller-El I highlights the association between the 
magnitude of the race disparities and the strength of the inference that the 
prosecutorial race-neutral explanations reflect pretext. For example, Justice 
Kennedy contrasts the 47-percentage point (0.53–0.06) race disparity in the 
rates that Miller-El’s prosecutors predicated their questions about the death 
penalty with an explicit description of a Texas execution103 with the 82-point 
(0.94–0.12) race disparity in the rates that the prosecution provided 
information to the venire members on the state of Texas law concerning the 
minimum sentence available for defendants convicted of first-degree 
murder.104 He notes that the 47-point disparity was less suggestive of race 
motivation in the use of prosecutorial peremptories than the 82-point 
disparity.105 
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s opinion provides useful guidance on the 
“weight” that should be attributed to statistically based pattern-and-practice 
evidence “raising a suspicion” that an individual strike was racially motivated. 
In his opinion, the unadjusted 91-point race disparity in the prosecutorial 
strike rates “raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a 
race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”106 In connection with 
allegedly pretextual reasons offered to “justify the removal of African-
Americans from the venire,”107 he quotes with approval language from 
Batson to the effect that “under some circumstances proof of discriminatory 
impact ‘may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality 
because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to 
explain on nonracial grounds.’”108 
 
 101. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342–43. Justice Souter referenced Miller-El I in Miller-El II and 
emphasized the disparity in strike rates in his concluding analysis. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240–
41, 265. 
 102. The Court conducted a similar comparative analysis of the prosecution’s differential 
questioning strategies that were allegedly designed to make the black venire members more 
vulnerable to strikes for cause. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 345. Miller-El II repeats and quotes this 
information as well. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 260–62. 
 103. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 344. 
 104. Id. at 345. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 342. 
 107. Id. at 345. 
 108. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)). 
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Use of statistical measures of discrimination also requires that the court 
understand the impact of chance or racially neutral factors in the analysis.109 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion highlights the importance of evaluating the 
plausibility that rival nonracial hypotheses may explain the racial disparities 
documented by a Batson claimant. Justice Kennedy’s references to “chance 
or accident”110 and “[h]appenstance”111 clearly reflect his concern about the 
importance of discounting chance as a nonracial rival hypothesis.112 Justice 
Souter repeated these references in Miller-El II.113 Although Miller-El 
apparently did not present measures of the statistical significance of the key 
disparities in his case, had he done so they would have clearly discounted 
the rival hypothesis of chance.114 
The 78-point difference in strike rates in Miller-El’s case is an 
“unadjusted” disparity because it does not take into account or “adjust” for 
the impact of other relevant venire-member characteristics. The second 
race-neutral rival hypothesis discussed in Miller-El I was the risk that the 78-
point disparity in strike rates was an artifact of a failure to control for race-
neutral characteristics of the venire members, such as their attitudes about 
capital punishment, the criminal histories in their families, and other 
legitimate venire-member characteristics. In this situation, risk of a faulty 
inference of the pattern-and-practice issue would exist if, on average, the 
black and white venire members did not face a comparable risk of 
prosecutorial strike once these race-neutral factors are considered. If such 
differences in strike-proneness did exist, the introduction of controls for 
those factors would explain away the 78-point race disparity.115 
The extent to which statistical evidence offered by a defendant in 
support of a prima facie case must be adjusted for race-neutral factors 
remains unclear in this area of law. In Miller-El I the State conceded that a 
prima facie case had been established and the Supreme Court agreed, 
stating that the unadjusted evidence of a pattern and practice of 
 
 109. Also relevant are case characteristics, such as the defendant’s and victim’s racial 
characteristics in the case. 
 110. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 346 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 259 (1986)). 
 111. Id. at 342. 
 112. Justice Kennedy also cites other cases ruling out the possible influence of chance. Id. 
at 346.  
 113. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). 
 114. The authors’ analysis of the data presented in the case showed that each of the 
unadjusted disparities was statistically significant beyond the 0.001 level. 
 115. On this point it is useful to distinguish between the question of whether there was a 
pattern and practice of discrimination, which motivated some, but not all, of the black venire-
member strikes, and the question of which strikes against individual black venire members 
could be explained by one or more race-neutral characteristics. Miller-El appears to have 
agreed that of the ten blacks peremptorily struck by the prosecution, four of the strikes could 
be explained by race-neutral factors. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 252 n.11; id. at 286 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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discrimination was sufficient to establish a prima facie case.116 This suggests 
that a prima facie Batson case need not rest on adjusted race disparity. The 
Court nevertheless expressed interest in the extent to which controls for 
race-neutral factors could explain the race disparities documented in Miller-
El’s case and, by implication, in the other cases prosecuted by the 
administration of the District Attorney responsible for the Miller-El 
prosecution.117 As discussed below, the question of control goes directly to 
the weight of the evidence in the stage-three pretext analysis. 
While it may be possible to identify and control for the impact of some 
race-neutral characteristics, any analysis is vulnerable to challenge on the 
grounds that an important characteristic has been overlooked or cannot be 
measured systematically. For an omitted variable to bias an estimated race 
disparity in a pattern-and-practice analysis, it must be associated (i.e., 
correlated) with both the outcome of interest (in this case the prosecution’s 
peremptory strikes) and the racial characteristics of the persons to whom the 
disparity relates (in this case the race of the venire members). Justice 
Kennedy recognized and applied this principle well. First, he noted that 
venire-member ambivalence about the death penalty and a family history of 
criminality do not appear to be associated with venire-member race 
(undercutting the second prong of the dual association rule).118 Second, he 
notes that the presence of these race-neutral factors does not always result in 
a peremptory strike (undercutting the first prong of the dual association 
rule).119 Third, he suggested that “the application of these rationales to the 
venire might have been selective and based on racial considerations” 
(undercutting the uniform-application assumption).120 Justice Kennedy’s 
analysis here recommends the one-by-one comparative juror analyses that 
provide compelling support for the Batson claim in Miller-El II and Snyder.121 
This portion of Justice Kennedy’s analysis drew the sharpest 
disagreement from Justice Thomas (dissenting)122 and Justice Scalia 
(concurring).123 They differed on their perceptions of the nature of the 
nonracial variables that motivated prosecutorial strikes, the correlation of 
the variables with venire-member race, and their correlation with the 
prosecutor’s peremptory strikes. 
 
 116. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347. 
 117. Id. at 343. 
 118. Id. 
 119. “In this case, three of the State’s proffered race-neutral rationales for striking African-
American jurors pertained just as well to some white jurors who were not challenged and who 
did serve on the jury.” Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483–84 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 
545 U.S. 231, 241–52 (2005). The Court in Miller-El II noted that this comparison need not rely 
on treatment of “an exactly identical white juror.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 247 n.6. 
 122. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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The Court also provided guidance on the admissibility and import of 
anecdotal evidence that might illuminate general matters, such as culture or 
office policies on proper standards for the use of peremptories. On the issue 
of historical discrimination, Miller-El I introduces useful distinctions among a 
“culture of . . . bias against” blacks in the District Attorney’s Office, a policy 
of “systematic exclusion” of blacks, and the “motives underlying” the 
peremptory strikes against black venire members in Miller-El’s case.124 In its 
consideration of the connection between the prosecutorial actions in Miller-
El’s case and the culture or policy of the District Attorney’s Office, the Court 
notes that both of Miller-El’s prosecutors “received formal training in 
excluding minorities from juries.”125 
In summation, Miller-El resolved a number of significant issues, the most 
important of which is the relevance in stage three of the Batson evidentiary 
framework of pattern-and-practice evidence initially proffered in support of 
a prima facie case in stage one. In addition, Justice Kennedy’s analysis 
provides helpful guidance on the relevance and interpretation of statistical 
evidence of discrimination. 
IV.  A CASE IN POINT: COMMONWEALTH V. HAROLD WILSON 
Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson is one of a number of Pennsylvania cases 
since 2000 addressing the role of race in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges by Commonwealth attorneys.126 In the remainder of this Article, 
we use the statistical evidence presented in Wilson as an example of effective 
pattern-and-practice evidence that both follows the evidentiary guidance 
provided in the Miller-El line of cases and highlights issues relevant to future 
Batson litigation. 
A. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY OVERVIEW 
In 1989, Harold Wilson, an African-American, was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death for killing three black victims. He 
was prosecuted by Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon, an experienced 
Philadelphia prosecutor, who in voir dire struck 67% (12/18) of the black 
venire members and 23% (6/26) of the white venire members that he 
considered.127 This represents a 44-percentage point (0.67–0.23) race-of-
 
 124. Id. at 347 (majority opinion); see also Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 263–65. 
 125. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347. 
 126. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. 
Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1145–46 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 95–96 (Pa. 
2008); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 722 & n.7 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. 
Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 610 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 48–49 (Pa. 
2002); Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa. 2000). 
 127. A complete breakdown of the racial composition of the jury, proof of how the defense 
identified the race of the jurors, and the exercise of the parties’ peremptory strikes is included 
in the factual proffer presented by the defense at the Batson hearing. See Factual Proffer, Part II-
A, Source of Information on Race of Jurors at 43–45, Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, July 
A2_BALDUS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2012  7:28 PM 
2012] STATISTICAL PROOF OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 1447 
venire member disparity that is significant at the .001 level. The ratio of 
these strike rates is 2.9 to 1 (0.67/0.23). 
McMahon accepted four black jurors even though at the close of jury 
selection he had two remaining peremptories. The proportion of blacks on 
the jury was 0.33 (4/12) with one additional black serving as an alternate. 
McMahon also peremptorily struck one Hispanic venire member. Some 
courts reviewing Batson claims would consider these facts conclusive 
evidence in favor of the Batson respondent, thereby defeating the claim.128 
After all, black venire members maintained a presence on the jury, and 
McMahon could have eliminated at least two more and did not. The 
evidence presented below suggests that such a conclusion may be both 
premature and erroneous. 
On Wilson’s direct appeal, the Batson claim underlay an argument that 
Wilson’s trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object “on Batson 
grounds to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in a 
discriminatory manner.”129 One problem with the direct appeal was that 
Wilson did not know the racial composition of the final jury or the race of 
two of the venire members struck by McMahon (who turned out to be 
black).130 Subsequently, the court denied the Batson claim.131 In August 
1997, Wilson filed a petition seeking relief in a state post-conviction 
proceeding, alleging that Philadelphia prosecutors violated his rights under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by peremptorily striking jurors on 
the basis of race and gender.132 
 
Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271 (Phila. C. P., Crim. Div. Oct. 17, 2002); see also Exhibit D-
12 Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271 (complete 
summary of race of juror information in Wilson’s case). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 422 F. App’x 489, 495 (6th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 
S. Ct. 351; Bennett v. Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2010); Golphin v. Branker, 519 
F.3d 168, 183 (4th Cir. 2008); Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577–78 (1st Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Johnson, 182 F. App’x 423, 427–28 (6th Cir. 2006); Bennett v. Bartley, No. 07 
C 1975, 2008 WL 4866169, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786. 
 129. Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, 672 A.2d 293, 298 (Pa. 1996). 
 130. Id. at 299. Unfortunately, Pennsylvania law and practice do not preserve information 
on the racial composition of the venire and the final jury. 
 131. Id. (“The fact that the Commonwealth used 10 of its 20 peremptory challenges for 
African-American veniremen and a hispanic venireman without more is insufficient to establish 
a prima facie case that the Commonwealth acted improperly . . . . Moreover, the 
Commonwealth argues that there was a neutral reason for each challenge the Appellant cites as 
improper. Finally, the final racial composition of the jury is unclear from the record. Because 
Appellant has failed to articulate the basis on which a claim of prejudice exists, trial counsel 
cannot be deemed to be ineffective.”). 
 132. Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Under Article I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and Post-Conviction Relief Act, Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, July Term, 
1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271 (Phila. C. P., Crim. Div. August 18, 1997). On his gender 
discrimination claim under J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), Wilson alleged 
that McMahon had used fourteen of the eighteen peremptory challenges he employed in the 
case to strike female jurors, exercising 3.5 peremptory strikes against women for every 
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As Wilson’s post-conviction proceeding was pending, two new pieces of 
evidence became available to support his Batson claim. First, in April 1997, a 
1987 training videotape for Philadelphia prosecutors became public.133 The 
policies promoted in the videotape very closely tracked the policies 
advanced in the training manual discussed in Miller-El II.134 Wilson’s 
prosecutor, McMahon, was the sole presenter on the Philadelphia training 
tape. McMahon identified with particularity his conception of the best and 
the worst jurors.135 The worst jurors according to McMahon are “blacks from 
the low-income areas” because they are less likely to convict as a result of 
“resentment for law enforcement [and] . . . for authority.”136 The tape 
distinguished, however, between good and bad black jurors on the basis of 
their age and gender. Indeed, McMahon criticized other prosecutors who 
viewed all blacks as bad jurors.137 In McMahon’s calculus, the worst (“very 
bad”) black jurors were young men and women138 and any who are “real 
educated.”139 These jurors were followed by older black women whom 
McMahon indicated may be inclined to “identify” with young black males 
 
peremptory strike against a man. Id. at 11. He further alleged that the prosecution had 
peremptorily challenged fourteen of the twenty-three women it had the opportunity to accept 
or strike (61%), while accepting sixteen of the twenty male jurors it had the opportunity to 
accept or strike (80%). Id. Thus, the Petition argued, “McMahon was 3.04 times more likely to 
peremptorily strike a female juror than he was a male juror.” Id. It further argued that “the 
prosecution used 77.7% of its peremptory strikes against women, despite the fact that only 
53.5% of the jurors who could be subject to Commonwealth peremptories were women.” Id.  
 Wilson’s Batson claim was far less developed. At the time he filed his petition, he was able 
to identify the race of thirty-two of the jurors in the general venire, twenty of whom were white 
and twelve of whom were black. Id. at 12. He alleged that, among these individuals, the 
prosecution peremptorily struck 58% (seven) of the black jurors and only 20% (four) of the 
white jurors—a rate that was 2.92 times higher for black jurors. Id. Based upon the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s opinion on direct review, Wilson alleged that McMahon had employed half of 
his eighteen peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, even though they comprised a 
“substantially smaller portion of the general venire.” Id. 
 133. Videotape: Jury Selection with Jack McMahon (DATV Prods. 1987) [hereinafter 
McMahon Tape], available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-5102834972975877286 
(transcript of videotape was introduced as Exhibit D-2 at the evidentiary hearing in Wilson, was 
introduced in other Pennsylvania cases, and is on file with authors). The Office of the District 
Attorney of Philadelphia released this video in April 1997. See Loren Feldman, I, the Jury, PHILA. 
MAG., June 1997, at 21; Former Philadelphia Prosecutor Accused of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 
1997), www.nytimes.com/1997/04/03/us/former-philadelphia-prosecutor-accused-of-racial-
bias.html; Prosecutor’s Tape on Juries Results in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 1997), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1997/04/04/us/prosecutor-s-tape-on-juries-reults-in-mistrial.html. 
 134. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 263–64 (2005) (discussing the 
training policies). 
 135. McMahon Tape, supra note 133, passim. 
 136. Id. at 47–48. 
 137. Id. at 56. 
 138. Id. at 57. 
 139. Id. at 55. 
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(the “maternal instinct”).140 By contrast, McMahon said that black men have 
less parental “instinct” and were a “little bit more demanding and a little bit 
more [into] law and order.”141 Among black men, he distinctly preferred 
older men (over seventy) from the South because they were of a “different 
era and different time and [had a] different respect for the law.”142 
McMahon also instructed the prosecutors who attended his lecture to always 
keep track of the race of potential venirepersons, to “count them. Count the 
blacks and whites. You want to know at every point in that case where you 
are.”143 
As a defense against Batson claims, McMahon recommended that “the 
best way to avoid any problems . . . is to protect yourself.”144 The way to do 
this was to question black jurors “at length” and record contemporaneous 
documentation of “legitimate” reasons as each black is struck.145 With these 
reasons at hand, a prosecutor who is challenged later in the trial would be 
able to present nonracial reasons for the strikes against blacks.146 
Our systematic investigation of the prosecutorial use of peremptories in 
all Philadelphia capital cases in which we could locate data on the 
prosecutorial use of peremptories provided the second evidentiary 
development in Wilson’s case.147 This investigation provided the statistical 
evidence discussed in detail below.148 By October 1997, Wilson’s lawyers had 
 
 140. Id. at 56. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. McMahon argues that black men from the South are “excellent.” Id. Contrary to 
what one might have expected, McMahon’s goal was not an all-white jury, but rather one with 
three or four blacks. Id. at 58–59. Although he did not address this concern, there is an obvious 
Batson problem with an all-white jury in a county with 35% black venire members. Rather he 
argued that a reasonable representation of blacks on the jury was necessary to protect against 
possible jury nullification by non-black jurors in black-on-black homicides, who may not care as 
much about the victim or identify with the state’s witnesses. Id. at 58–61. 
 143. Id. at 66–67. Counting was so important that McMahon advised young district 
attorneys to invent reasons to leave the courtroom to ascertain the racial composition of 
upcoming venirepersons “if you lose track or you’re not sure of what’s going on.” Id. at 67. 
 144. Id. at 69. 
 145. Id. at 70 (“[O]n this little sheet that you have, mark something down that you can 
articulate later . . . if something happens . . . .”); id. at 71 (“[Y]ou may want to ask more 
questions of those people so it gives you more ammunition to make an articulable reason as to why 
you are striking them, not for race.” (emphasis added)). 
 146. Id. at 71. 
 147. Catherine Grosso did not participate in this research. 
 148. This study initially located data on 15 capital cases prosecuted by McMahon, as well as 
data on 100 other capital cases prosecuted by the office of District Attorney Ronald Castille, 
whose tenure embraced the Wilson prosecution, and 120 and 183 cases prosecuted, 
respectively, in the administrations of District Attorney Edward G. Rendell and Lynne Abraham 
from 1981 to 1997. These data all documented race disparities that were consistent with the 
disparities documented in the Castille administration. 
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obtained information on jury strikes by McMahon across sixteen 
prosecutions.149 
With this information and a transcription of the McMahon videotape, 
Wilson’s lawyers filed a supplemental post-conviction petition devoted 
entirely to the jury discrimination claims.150 Wilson argued that McMahon 
had peremptorily struck black venirepersons 72% of the time he had an 
opportunity to do so (and nearly 73% of the time in homicide cases), while 
striking venirepersons who were not black barely 16% of the time (and 17% 
of the time in homicide cases).151 He pled, based upon this data, that an 
African-American venireperson called for jury duty in a homicide 
prosecution by Mr. McMahon was nearly 4.25 times more likely to be 
peremptorily struck than a venireperson who was not black.152 
Judge Temin originally dismissed Wilson’s Batson claim as having been 
previously litigated on direct appeal.153 On appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded in light of the new evidence 
 
 149. Fourteen of these cases were homicide cases; the other two were nonhomicide felony 
cases for which Wilson had access to the jury selection transcript. Wilson’s lawyers then argued 
to the court that these cases did not exhaust the universe of homicide cases prosecuted by Mr. 
McMahon, citing a statement District Attorney spokesperson William Davol made during the 
course of McMahon’s 1997 campaign for District Attorney that he had obtained 36 jury murder 
convictions during his tenure from 1983 to 1990 in the District Attorney’s Office. See L. Stuart 
Ditzen et al., Avoid Black Jurors, McMahon Said, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 1, 1997, at A01. With this 
additional information, Wilson’s counsel sought discovery of the identity of all homicide 
prosecutions he had not been able to independently identify that McMahon had tried to a jury. 
 150. Supplement to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Under Article I, Section 14 and 
Post-Conviction Relief Act, Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 
3270, 3271 (Phila. C. P., Crim. Div., October 30, 1997). 
 151. Id. ¶ 3. 
 152. The supplemental petition also argued that the statistical disparities were even more 
pronounced in the case of African-American women. The data from his sixteen cases indicated 
that McMahon peremptorily struck African-American women more than 75% of the time, as 
compared to only 20% of non-African-American women and 12% of non-African-American 
men. From this data, Wilson pled that McMahon struck African-American women at more than 
six times the rate of non-African-American males. Id. ¶ 4. At the time of the supplemental 
petition, the study had obtained information on prosecutorial strikes and acceptances of jurors 
in 88 of the Castille-administration capital prosecutions. This encompassed more than 1900 
jurors whose race we could identify to a 98% or greater level of certainty. Wilson pled that these 
strikes exhibited “a consistent policy and practice of striking African Americans and women 
from venires,” id. ¶ 16, and that in those prosecutions, the District Attorney’s office struck 
African-American venirepersons 58% of the time, while striking non-black jurors only 22% of 
the time. Id. Overall, Castille-administration prosecutors peremptorily struck African-American 
women 62% of the time and African-American males 51% of the time. Id. ¶ 17. By contrast, 
they struck only 25% of other women and only 20% of other men. Id. Thus, Wilson argued, 
prosecutors peremptorily struck black jurors at more than two-and-one-half times the rate of 
non-black jurors during the Castille administration and struck African-American women with 
more than triple the frequency of men who were not African American. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.  
 153. Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271, slip op. at 
9–11 (Phila. C. P., Crim. Div., Jan. 31, 2000). 
A2_BALDUS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2012  7:28 PM 
2012] STATISTICAL PROOF OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 1451 
contained in the McMahon tape.154 On remand, an issue arose over the 
relevance of the McMahon cases other than Wilson’s own case, and the 
relevance of the cases prosecuted by other district attorneys during the 
Castille administration. Judge Temin, in whose court the action was 
pending, ruled that data from the other McMahon cases were relevant.155 At 
the same time, Judge Temin ruled, on grounds of relevancy, that she would 
not consider cases tried by prosecutors other than McMahon during the 
Rendell and Castille administrations.156 Nor would she consider evidence of 
cases from the Abraham administration. The District Attorney’s Office then 
unsuccessfully sought to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court limit the 
evidence solely to the jury selection in Wilson’s case.157 
After several rounds of pleadings and reports by experts for both sides, 
Judge Temin ruled that the McMahon training videotape established a 
prima facie case and directed that the hearing focus on stages two and three 
of the Batson framework, with Prosecutor McMahon as the key witness.158 In 
a two-day evidentiary hearing in December 2002, Prosecutor McMahon 
denied that race had been a factor in his use of peremptories in Wilson.159 
 
 154. Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, No. 294 Capital Appeal Docket (Pa. Apr. 26, 2000) 
(per curiam) (on file with author) (“[T]he request for a remand for an evidentiary hearing, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to petitioner’s, Harold Christopher Wilson’s, 
claims of discrimination in the jury selection process is granted.”). 
 155. In addition, she ordered the state to give Wilson’s counsel the names and docket 
numbers of all McMahon cases not in our original database. Post-Conviction Relief Act 
Transcript 9/7/00, at 46, Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271. This eventually 
increased the databases of McMahon cases to thirty-five. See Baldus, et al., Supplemental Report 
No. 1 Concerning Race and Gender Discrimination in the Prosecutorial Use of Peremptory 
Strikes in Philadelphia Capital Trials, Appendix A (July 25, 2001), Wilson, July Term, 1988, 
Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271. 
 156. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had ruled in Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 
717, 731 (2000), that the McMahon tape was relevant as circumstantial evidence of McMahon’s 
intent but would not, itself, “suffice to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination on the 
part of the Office of the District Attorney in general or by assistant district attorneys other than 
Mr. McMahon.” 
 157. See Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, No. 294 Capital Appeal Docket (Pa. Apr. 26, 
2000) (per curiam) (on file with author) (Petition to Clarify Remand Order Pursuant to Rule 
2591(b)). In response, Wilson argued the relevance of statistical and pattern-and-practice 
evidence and that the remand order was clear on its face. Response to District Attorney's 
Interlocutory Motion to Limit Evidentiary Hearing (filed Jan. 23, 2001). The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court issued a per curiam order on February 12, 2001, denying the prosecution's 
motion. Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, No. 294 Capital Appeal Docket (Pa. Feb. 12, 2001) 
(per curiam). 
 158. Post-Conviction Relief Act Transcript 9/7/00 at 14–16, Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 
3267, 3270, 3271. 
 159. When asked about his training tape, McMahon explained that his stated concern 
about “black” venire members was a proxy for a broad concern about individuals with low 
“socioeconomic status,” who often lacked respect for law and authority and harbored a dislike 
for police. McMahon also attempted to offer specific race-neutral explanations for each of his 
twelve peremptory strikes against black venire members. He was handicapped in this regard 
because he had selected the jury more than ten years earlier and his contemporaneous notes 
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B. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE CASE 
This Subpart presents, in more detail, the pattern-and-practice evidence 
in Wilson’s case. We view this data against the properties of the ideal model 
of proof presented above and explain how we dealt with the shortfalls from 
that ideal that inevitably occur in this type of empirical research. 
1.  The Rule of Relevancy 
The rule of relevancy applies within each case and between cases. 
Focusing first within cases, reliable inferences about prosecutorial 
motivations require that the analysis of prosecutorial strikes focuses 
exclusively on prosecutorial decisions in prosecutorial strike-eligible cases. 
For each case, this required excluding from the analysis venire members 
struck for cause or struck by defense counsel before Prosecutor McMahon 
could consider them for a possible strike. 
A number of courts have deviated from this approach and contrast the 
number and proportion of blacks on the venire with the number and 
proportion on the jury.160 As discussed above, this overall impact analysis is 
not consistent with the rule of relevancy because it embraces the impact of 
defense counsel’s peremptory strikes. Because of the courts’ continuing 
 
contained biographical information about the jurors but did not record the reasons for his 
strikes. Rather he refreshed his memory by reading the venire-member questionnaires and 
notes of the voir dire question and answer, which indicated the questions of the court and 
counsel and the venire member responses. For some venire members, he expressed certainty 
about the basis for his strike. These typically related to a criminogenic history in the venire 
member’s family (e.g., a brother in jail) or the venire member’s employment in the “social 
welfare” sector.  
For several other venire members, he was less certain but believed that the voir dire 
questions and venire-member answers would have caused him concern about a lack of “stability” 
in the person’s personal life, family life, or employment; or lack of character. For at least three 
venire members, he admitted that the documents could not refresh his recollection and he 
could not present clear and specific race-neutral explanations for his strikes. For instance, he 
described his strike of an elderly African-American woman as “fall[ing] in the category that I’m 
not sure.” Post-Conviction Relief Act Transcript 12/11/02, at 35, Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 
3267, 3270, 3271. The Commonwealth later argued that McMahon “gave credible nonracial 
reasons for nine of his strikes,” Post-Conviction Relief Act Transcript 12/19/02, at 22, Wilson, 
July Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271, implicitly admitting that he had failed to do so for 
three others. For these jurors, he explained that the strikes must have been on the basis of 
“intangibles” such as how well the venire member was dressed, his or her overall appearance, or 
hesitancy in answering questions. See, e.g., Post-Conviction Relief Act Transcript 12/11/02 at 
32–35, 37, 43–45, Wilson, July Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271. Cross-examination and final 
argument of counsel challenged these assertions by pointing out that the Commonwealth had 
accepted a number of white venire members with similar characteristics. See, e.g., id. at 26–32 
(cross-examination); Post-Conviction Relief Act Transcript 2/19/02, at 13–20, Wilson, July 
Term, 1988, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271 (closing argument).  
 160. See, e.g., Franklin v. Sims, 538 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting with approval the 
reliance of the Illinois Appellate Court on this approach); Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 168, 
183 (4th Cir. 2008); Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 577 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1521–22 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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interest in the racial composition of the finally selected jury, however, the 
substantive analyses in Wilson also reported the overall impact data reflecting 
the combined impact of both the prosecutorial and defense counsel’s use of 
peremptories. 
Wilson’s counsel presented analyses of jury selection in Wilson’s case 
and also offered evidence to establish a pattern and practice of race 
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges in (a) 34 cases tried by 
Prosecutor McMahon in addition to Wilson; (b) 115 cases prosecuted during 
the administration of District Attorney Castille, which was responsible for 
the Wilson prosecution; (c) 120 cases tried in the administration of District 
Attorney Rendell, who preceded Castille; and (d) 183 tried in the 
administration of District Attorney Abraham, who succeeded Castille. All of 
these cases constituted the intended universe of the study, referred to above, 
that we commenced in 1997. Our position was that each level of analysis 
passed the rule of relevancy in that it had the capacity to enhance or 
diminish an inference that race was a motivating factor in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges in Wilson’s case. 
In Wilson’s post-conviction proceeding in state court, the 
Commonwealth contested the relevance of evidence based on the broader 
universe of cases. This case preceded Miller-El and the Court had provided 
little guidance before Miller-El about the appropriate scope of pattern-and-
practice evidence. As noted above, however, Miller-El I indicates that all of 
the Castille administration cases, including McMahon’s, are relevant to 
evaluating the strength of the inference of discrimination.161 Title VII law 
also provides support for this conclusion.162 It provides that decisions made 
by decision makers in different offices of the same corporate defendant 
sometimes may be considered together to infer corporate policy for the 
entire organization.163 If McMahon’s other cases, and the other Castille 
administration cases, show no race effects, the argument is strengthened 
that the race disparity estimated in Wilson was a statistical fluke. On the 
other hand, consistent findings of race effects adverse to black venire 
members across these cases support an inference of a policy and practice of 
racial bias, which draws into question the credibility of McMahon’s race-
neutral explanations offered to explain his peremptory strikes against the 
individual black venire members in Wilson. 
This logic also suggests that cases from the Rendell and Abraham 
administrations are relevant. A finding of no race effects in the other two 
administrations would support an inference that a policy of race 
discrimination was peculiar to the Castille administration; similarly, 
 
 161. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 346–47 (2003) (noting that district-
wide evidence “of course, is relevant” to the case). 
 162. Cf. 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 2286. 
 163. Id. 
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consistent findings of race discrimination across either the Rendall or 
Abraham administrations would speak volumes about the depth and 
strength of the bias against black venire members in Philadelphia and its 
likely impact on McMahon’s strikes in Wilson. 
As noted above, Judge Temin ruled that the universe of cases would be 
strictly limited to the capital cases tried by McMahon and that the other 
capital cases tried in the Castille administration, as well as all cases tried in 
the Rendell and Abraham administrations, were not relevant. Accordingly, 
the reports we prepared for Wilson were limited to statistical evidence on 
Wilson and the other cases tried by Prosecutor McMahon. However, in this 
Article, consistent with the teaching of Miller-El and the Title VII cases, we 
present data on a broader universe of capital cases from all three 
administrations of the office of the Philadelphia District Attorney between 
1981 and 1997. 
2.  A Representative Sample of Relevant Cases 
An ideal model of proof in this context would be based on an analysis of 
venire members from all cases in our intended universe of 463 capital 
prosecutions from 1981 to 1997. Our source of information on this universe 
of Philadelphia capital cases was a master list of first-degree murder cases 
maintained by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts. 
However, the files of many of the capital cases could not be located. 
Specifically, the larger study includes only 68% (317/463) of the universe of 
the capital cases of which we are aware. As long as the reason for a shortfall 
of cases or other data is a completely random event, it may be safe to 
proceed on the basis that the remaining cases constitute essentially a 
random sample of cases. (It would be important to consult with a statistical 
expert in this situation. In our case, we determined the cause—i.e., lost 
files—to be a random event and proceeded on this basis.) 
For the McMahon cases, our initial sample consisted of 15 cases that 
emerged in the sample described above. Aside from that sample, we had no 
knowledge of other capital cases McMahon had tried. As the litigation 
progressed, Judge Temin ordered the Commonwealth to produce a list 
naming all McMahon prosecutions of which it was aware. This produced a 
list of 39 McMahon homicide prosecutions, from which we were able to 
locate case files with the needed information in 20 more cases. Our final 
sample of McMahon cases consisted, in addition to Wilson, of 19 capital 
prosecutions, 8 noncapital homicide cases, and 7 nonhomicide cases. 
3.  Valid and Complete Data on All Relevant Variables 
An ideal model of proof is based on an analysis of valid data for all 
relevant variables. In this research, the list of relevant variables included 
name, strike eligibility, final status, race, gender, and age. In addition, we 
collected information on venire-member residential address, education, 
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occupation, and venire-members’ answers to questions posed by the court to 
the entire venire at the outset of the voir dire (“questions answered data”). 
We obtained this information from court records, voter registration 
rolls, and census data. On the basis of these data, we produced “98% 
reliable” estimates164 for the race of 75% of the venire members, for the 
gender of 97% of the venire members, and for the age of 83% of the venire 
members.165 This estimation procedure is described in the lead article on 
related research conducted in Philadelphia by David Baldus and George 
Woodworth.166 
C. VALID MEASURES OF THE PRACTICAL AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BLACK 
VENIRE MEMBER RACE DISPARITIES 
We rely principally on what we consider to be the most probative 
measures of disparate treatment in the prosecutorial use of peremptories. As 
suggested by Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Miller-El I, both measures are 
comparative.167 The first rests on a contrast between prosecutorial strike 
rates exercised against black and non-black venire members. The second is a 
contrast between prosecutorial strike rates after adjusting for race-neutral 
factors, both one at a time and collectively. These are referred to as 
unadjusted and adjusted disparities, respectively. The contrast is expressed 
first as an arithmetic difference between the two rates. 
1.  Unadjusted Black Venire Member Race Disparities168 
We first consider the unadjusted race disparities in Wilson’s case. As 
noted above, the most probative measures are based on contrasts between 
the prosecutorial strike rates of black and non-black venire members. The 
data in Figure 1, Column A, document a 44-percentage point disparity 
(0.67–0.23) between the two rates. This means that the average black venire 
member’s chance of being struck was 44-percentage points higher than the 
average non-black venire member. The ratio between those rates is 2.9 
(0.67/0.23) meaning that the average black venire member’s risk of being 
struck was nearly three times higher than the average non-black venire 
member. Both disparities are statistically significant beyond the 0.006 level, 
 
 164. By 98% reliable estimates, we mean that if we estimate a venire member’s race to be 
black or non-black, there is a 98% probability that they are black or non-black, as the case may 
be. 
 165. The age groups are young (18–29), mid-age (30–55), and older (above 55). 
 166. See Baldus et al., supra note 40. 
 167. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I), 537 U.S. 322, 331 (2003). 
 168. By “unadjusted” we mean that the disparity does not control for or take into account 
other factors that may influence peremptory strike rates. In further analyses presented below, 
we report race disparities that control for gender and age, and gender disparities that control 
for race and age. We also estimate disparities after adjustment for the race of the defendant and 
victim as well as the district attorney administration in which the case was tried. 
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which means that disparities of that magnitude would occur by chance in an 
evenhanded system fewer than 1 in 6,000 times. 
FIGURE 1 
UNADJUSTED RACE DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTORIAL USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
(The bars represent prosecutorial strike rates against black and non-black venire members.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ** Denotes a statistically significant disparity at the .01 level. 
 *** Denotes a statistically significant disparity at the .001 level. 
 
We also apply another relevant, although less focused, measure of 
disparate treatment that is sometimes used in the judicial evaluation of 
Batson claims. It contrasts the proportion of blacks among (a) prosecutorial 
strike-eligible venire members, and (b) venire persons peremptorily struck 
by the Commonwealth.169 The contrast here is between 0.41 (18/44), the 
proportion of blacks among McMahon’s strike-eligible venire members, and 
0.67 (12/18), the proportion of blacks among all of McMahon’s 
peremptory strikes. This 26 percentage point difference (0.67–0.41) is also 
statistically significant (p = 0.05). In practical terms for the Wilson venire 
members, on the basis of McMahon’s overall strike rate of 0.41, one would 
 
 169. See, e.g., Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 620 (3d Cir. 2011); Coombs v. 
Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); Bennett v. Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Grice, 335 F. App’x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2009); McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t 
of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1257–59 (11th Cir. 2009); Dungen v. Estep, 311 F. App’x 99, 104 
(10th Cir. 2009); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2009); Paulino v. Harrison, 
542 F.3d 692, 695, 703 (9th Cir. 2008); Franklin v. Sims, 538 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 168, 183 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ervin, 266 F. App’x 
428, 431–32 (6th Cir. 2008); Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 576–77 (1st Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 461, 468, 470 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1205, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1107 
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1045–47 (11th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 512–14 (7th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Bartley, No. 07 C 
1975, 2008 WL 4866169, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786; 
People v. Ross, No. E038158, 2006 WL 3734965, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006). 
.67
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have expected to see 7 of the 18 black venire members struck, which is 5 
fewer than the 12 actually struck. Moreover, on the basis of McMahon’s 0.23 
strike rate against non-black venire members, one would have expected in a 
race-neutral system to see 4 black venire members struck, which is 8 fewer 
than the 12 actually struck.170 
We also identified “target groups” of venire members on the basis of the 
documented strike rates, the McMahon tape, and the literature. Specifically, 
we defined twelve subgroups of venire members based on a combination of 
race, gender, and age and compare and contrast the prosecutorial strike 
rates for each group. 
We referred above to a measure of the overall impact of both sides’ use 
of peremptories on the racial composition of the jury finally seated. This 
measure rests on a comparison of the proportion of blacks on the entire 
venire with the proportion of blacks on the jury finally seated. In Wilson, 
blacks constituted 34% (18/53) of the venire members who were not struck 
for cause and 33% (4/12) of the seated jurors. This measure indicates that 
defense counsel’s peremptory strike effort, which directed all 20 of his 
strikes against non-black venire members, was effective in maintaining a 
level of representation on the jury that mirrored the composition of the 
entire strike-eligible venire.171 
We also presented unadjusted disparities among all of the McMahon 
cases of which we are aware, as well as disparities among the capital cases 
prosecuted in the Rendell, Castille, and Abraham administrations. These are 
presented in Columns B–E of Figure 1. 
The estimates provide strong evidence of a pattern and practice of 
purposeful race discrimination in the selection of jurors over 20 years. With 
p-values well under the 0.05 level, it is very unlikely that the disparities in 
McMahon’s cases, in Column B, are a product of chance. The data support a 
similar conclusion with respect to disparities in Columns C, D, and E. 
2.  Adjustments for Race-Neutral Factors One at a Time 
In any analysis of race disparities and the inferences that they can 
support, it is important to test rival hypotheses that the documented 
disparities are the product of race-neutral factors. This was a matter of 
obvious concern to Justice Kennedy in his Miller-El I opinion for the court.172 
Disparities that have been adjusted for the impact of such factors are 
known as “adjusted” disparities of effects. Attention to adjusted effects is 
standard practice in Title VII pattern-and-practice cases, and we believe that 
 
 170. These results do not necessarily translate into 5 or 8 more jurors since some of the 
blacks rejected by the Commonwealth that would have been accepted in an evenhanded system 
may have been struck by defense counsel. 
 171. Defense counsel’s strike rate against non-blacks was 0.65 (20/31) compared to 0.00 
(0/12) against black venire members. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 106–08, 111–12.  
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this jurisprudence provides useful guidance in the Batson context.173 In 
employment cases, the basic rule is that the evidence of a pattern and 
practice of discrimination offered to make out a prima facie case should be 
adjusted for important qualifications that the employer is known to apply in 
its decision making.174 If the plaintiff can document substantial and 
significant race effects while controlling for the most important job 
qualifications as part of his or her prima facie case, the defendant–employer, 
in its rebuttal, may introduce variables for additional qualifications in an 
effort to explain away the race effects documented in the prima facie case. If 
the evidence offered on the prima facie case falls short of the ideal, it may 
be rejected or accepted with a concomitant reduction in the defendant’s 
burden in rebuttal.175 
As noted above, the Batson jurisprudence, including Miller-El, perceives 
unadjusted disparities as a sufficient basis for a prima facie case. However, 
Miller-El reflects a perception that a pattern and practice of race effect 
documented in an adjusted analysis would have greater weight in the 
credibility analysis at stage three. Thus, the selection of “control variables” is 
also important in the Batson concept. For Batson cases in general and in 
Wilson’s case in particular, we relied upon substantial jurisprudence, 
academic literature, and a practical “how to” literature on jury selection, 
which provides guidance on the identification of race-neutral factors for use 
as controls. In addition, in Philadelphia, an official questionnaire and 
standard voir dire questions put to the venire members by the court reflect a 
consensus on some core factors of concern to both sides. We can also obtain 
important guidance from the McMahon training tape and the empirical 
study we conducted of voir dire in 317 capital cases tried between 1981 and 
1999.176 Finally, we included in the Wilson analysis variables for the 
socioeconomic status of the venire members which the Commonwealth and 
Prosecutor McMahon allege are important determinants of his and other 
prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges.177 
The threshold inquiry in such cases is to identify the qualifications that 
are most important. Another relevant source for information on the issue is 
testimony of the actors involved in the case. Prosecutor McMahon tied his 
use of peremptories to a concern about low-income jurors. Although the 
venire-member questionnaires and voir dire questions do not address the 
income of venire members, it was possible for Prosecutor McMahon in voir 
 
 173. 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 2297–302 (discussing the use of 
regression analysis). 
 174. Id. at 2298 (discussing the analyses at issue in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 
(1986)). 
 175. Id. at 2297–302. 
 176. See Baldus et al., supra note 40. Catherine Grosso participated in this research only as a 
research assistant. 
 177. See supra note 159 (discussing McMahon’s theories). 
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dire to gauge a venire member’s income by his or her appearance or place 
of residence. To test the hypothesis, we developed two measures on income 
based on the neighborhood of the venire member. The first is the 
proportion of families in the census block-group of the venire member’s 
residence who had income levels below the poverty line in 1989. The second 
measure is the median 1990 family income in the census block-group of the 
venire member’s residence. We applied these measures to each venire 
member for whom we could identify his or her census block-group of 
residence.178 
Based on similar work with these and other sources of information, we 
identified the following controls for analysis: type of prosecution; District 
Attorney administration; venire member race, gender, age, occupation, and 
education; race of defendant; race of victim; level of poverty and median 
income for venire-member neighborhood of residence; and question 
answered data. 
We then introduced controls for race-neutral factors one at a time and 
in discrete combinations (for example, gender and age). We introduced a 
report, tables, and figures presenting these analyses to the court. In each 
instance we also presented measures of statistical significance (p-values). 
None of these analyses refuted the unadjusted findings reported above. 
Race continued to play a significant role in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges. Presenting controls one at a time has the advantage of being easy 
to present and explain to an audience unfamiliar with statistical analyses.179 
This approach, however, still lacks the full complexity of decision making, 
which often considers multiple factors at once.180 As a result, our next step 
was to consider the combined significance in a logistic multiple regression 
analysis that controls simultaneously for the most important race-neutral 
venire-member characteristics. 
3.  Race Disparities Estimated After Adjustment for Venire-Member 
Characteristics Simultaneously in a Logistic Regression Analysis 
Multivariate-analysis results provide solid evidence of how important 
specific race-neutral factors are in general in the prosecutor’s decision 
making and whether the prosecutor gave the same weight to the factor in his 
or her evaluation of black and non-black venire members. If a factor alleged 
 
 178. This information was missing for about 10% of the cases either because we could not 
obtain a residential address for the venire member or the address could not be linked to a 
census block-group.  
 179. See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1531 (2012).  
 180. Indeed, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office has itself argued against juror 
comparison based upon individual characteristics taken one at a time because no two jurors are 
exactly alike and multiple factors may have influenced a prosecutor’s decision to strike or 
accept a juror. See, e.g., Hardcastle v. Horn, 332 F. App’x 764, 766 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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as a race-neutral factor in a case in fact emerges as an important 
determinant in the prosecutor’s overall decision making, that evidence 
enhances the prosecution’s assertion that it was a motivating factor in her 
specific strike of a specific black venire member. However, a finding that a 
race-neutral factor alleged to explain a specific strike does not emerge as a 
generally important factor calls into question the assertion that it was a 
determinant of a specific strike. Similarly, if the data reveals that a factor 
appears to have been given more weight in striking blacks than non-blacks, 
an argument that it was a factor with respect to a specific black venire 
member is diminished. 
Accordingly, we computed a logistic regression model that included 
variables for the race, gender, and age of the venire members; any of the 
variables for venire-member occupation, education, and questions answered 
data; and the level of poverty in the venire member’s neighborhood of 
residence that entered the model in a forward stepwise logistic regression 
procedure at the 0.10 (or less) level of significance.181 Two occupation 
variables, four questions answered variables, and the variable for the level of 
poverty in the venire member’s neighborhood entered this analysis, the 
results of which are presented in Table 1. After controlling for these 
additional variables, the race and gender variables remained substantial and 
statistically significant. On average, the odds of a black venire member’s 
being struck were approximately 15 to 19 times higher than the odds of a 
non-black being struck.182  
 
  
 
 181. Variables entered the model at the 0.10 level but were removed if the p-value rose 
above 0.15 in a subsequent stage of the analysis, although variables so removed could 
subsequently reenter the model again at the 0.10 level or less. 
If the value for a variable for venire-member race, gender, age, education, occupation, 
neighborhood poverty, or questions answered was missing, we coded an applicable “missing-
data” variable to “1” for that venire member and recoded the underlying variable for which the 
data was missing to “0” for that venire member.  
 182. See Table 1, Part B.1(a) & (b). 
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TABLE 1 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL OF PROSECUTOR MCMAHON’S USE OF  
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN 35 PHILADELPHIA CRIMINAL CASES 1981–1990 
(This unit of observation is the individual venire member eligible  
for a peremptory strike by Prosecutor McMahon) (n = 1,142) 
 
A B C 
Odds 
Multiplier1 
Logistic 
Coefficient2 
(p-value) 
Part A.  Legitimate venire member (V.M.) characteristics
1. Occupation  
a. Professional and Managerial (10)3 7.0 1.9 (.001) 
b. V.M. Outside the Workforce (60) 2.0 .68 (.05) 
c. All Other Occupations (reference 
category)4 
1.0 NA 
d. Occupation Unknown 2.4 .89 (.03) 
2. Venire Member (V.M.) Affirmative Answers to 
Voir Dire Questions 
 
a. V.M. with Prior Jury Service (200) .35 -1.1 (.006) 
b. V.M., Close Friend, or Relative Accused of 
Criminal Activity (400) 
6.3 1.8 (.003) 
c. V.M., Close Friend or Relative Worked in 
Law Enforcement (600) 
.62 -.48 (.06) 
d. V.M. Expressed Concern About Imposing 
a Death Sentence (1300) or Expressed a 
View Contrary to Law on Another Subject 
(800) 
8.4 2.1 (.01) 
e. V.M.’s Answers Unknown 1.001 .001 (.99) 
3. Venire Member’s Age  
a. Young: 18-29 2.1 .75 (.001) 
b. Mid-age: 30-55 (reference category)        1.0 NA 
c. Older: 56+                 .61 -.48 (.06) 
d. Age Unknown 1.3 .29 (.25) 
4. Venire Member’s Income  
a. Proportion of V.M.’s Neighbors With 
Family Income Below the Poverty Line 
2.94 1.1 (.08) 
b. Neighborhood Income Level Unknown .61 .50 (.50) 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
 
A B C 
Odds 
Multiplier1 
Logistic 
Coefficient2 
(p-value) 
Part B.  Illegitimate/suspect venire-member characteristics
1. Venire Member’s Race  
a. Black (1= black) 15.6 2.7 (.0001) 
b. Proportion Black (estimated 2.1%-97.9%) 18.45 2.91 (0001) 
c. Race of Venire Member Unknown and 
Unestimated (1=unknown and 
unestimated) 
3.8 1.3 (.09) 
2.     Venire Member's Gender  
a. Female 1.6 .49 (.002) 
b. Male (reference category) 1.0 NA 
c. Gender unknown 1.6 .47 (.22) 
 
 1. The odds multiplier indicates the extent to which, on average, the odds of being 
struck are enhanced or diminished when the venire-member characteristic in Column A is 
present. The odds multiplier is based on the regression coefficient in Column C. 
 2.  The coefficients in this analysis were estimated in a logistic regression analysis of 
venire-member strike rates. In addition to the variables included in this table, the model 
includes case specific variables that indicate with which of the 35 cases in the study each venire 
member was associated. The inclusion of these case level variables minimizes the risk that 
extremely high or low strike-rates in a single case may bias the overall estimates of the average 
impact of the explanatory variables in Column A.  
 3. The numbers in parentheses after the variable description refer to codes in the Data 
Collection Instrument. 
  This odds multiplier indicates the average change in the odds of being struck between 
venire members living in hypothetical neighborhoods with no families below the poverty line 
and venire members residing in hypothetical neighborhoods with all families with incomes 
below the poverty line. The odds multiplier for a contrast between less extreme neighborhoods 
in terms of families with incomes below the poverty line, e.g., .25 v. .10, is a prorated version of 
this number. 
 4.  The odds multiplier indicates the average change in the odds of being struck between 
venire members residing in hypothetical neighborhoods with no black neighbors and venire 
members residing in hypothetical neighborhoods with all black neighbors. The odds multiplier 
for a contrast between less extreme neighborhoods in terms of the percentage of black 
neighbors, e.g., .25 v. .10, is a prorated version of this number. 
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To test further the role of race in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, we also modified this process in various ways consistent with the 
rule of relevancy. For example, we forced the analysis to include all of the 
education, occupation, questions answered variables, as well as the 
neighborhood poverty-level variable, without regard to whether they showed 
a statistically significant relationship to the prosecutorial strike rates. 
Alternately, we replicated the two regression analyses described above but 
limited them to the twenty-four cases in which we had data on venire-
member questions answered. None of these analyses suggested that the race 
finding was the product of chance. 
Our final method for assessing race and gender disparities after 
adjustment for facially neutral venire-member characteristics employs a 
measure of prosecution “strike-proneness” that is based on the results of the 
regression analysis presented in Table 1. For this purpose, we used the 
coefficients for the facially neutral venire-member characteristics estimated 
in the Table 1 regression analysis to compute for each venire member an 
estimated probability that they would be struck by Prosecutor McMahon. 
This means that the race and gender of the venire members were not taken 
into account in computing these probabilities.183 We refer to these estimates 
as a measure of prosecution “strike-proneness” based on facially neutral 
venire-member characteristics. With these, we created a seven-level scale of 
venire member strike-proneness that we used to evaluate the role of race in 
decision making.184 
Figure 2, which presents the results based on this scale, sorts the cases 
into the seven levels from 1 (low) to 7 (high). For the lowest strike-prone 
category in Part I, the average strike rate (indicated in the parenthetical over 
each pair of bars) is 0.13 (Level 1). Contrast this to the 0.91 average strike 
rate for the most strike-prone venire members at Level 7.185 
 
  
 
 183. We purged the race and gender effects from the model to ensure that the facially 
neutral variables did not indirectly reflect race and gender effects. The facially neutral venire-
member characteristics used for this purpose are age, education, occupation, the level of 
poverty in the venire member’s neighborhood, and answers to questions asked in voir dire. 
 184. The estimated strike probabilities at each level of the scale were as follows: (1) less 
than 0.26; (2) 0.26 to 0.299; (3) 0.30 to 0.349; (4) 0.35 to 0.379; (5) 0.38 to 0.409; (6) 0.41 to 
0.459; and (7) greater than or equal to 0.46. 
 185. The sample sizes and average strike rates for the different levels of the scale in Parts I 
and II vary somewhat because the cases with missing race or gender, which are excluded from 
Part I and II, differ as the case may be. 
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FIGURE 2 
VENIRE MEMBER RACE DISPARITIES IN PROSECUTOR MCMAHON’S USE OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES CONTROLLING FOR VENIRE MEMBER AGE, EDUCATION, OCCUPATION, 
NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY LEVEL, AND ANSWERS TO VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS IN A 
REGRESSION-BASED SCALE OF STRIKE-PRONENESS: FROM 1 (LOW PRONENESS) TO 7 (HIGH 
PRONENESS)1 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of Significance of Race Disparities: *=.001 
 
 
 
 1. The number in parentheses at the head of each column, for example, .13 in Part A, 
Column 1, indicates the average strike rate for all of the venire members in that subgroup of 
cases. The overall race of venire-member disparity adjusted for venire member education, 
occupation, neighborhood poverty level, and questions answered is 50 percentage points (.64-
.14) significant at the .0001 level. 
 
We first examined the distributions of black venire members across the 
different levels of the strike-proneness scale. They indicate that there is a 
significant association between venire member strike-proneness and race. 
Specifically, we found that the proportion of black venire members is lowest 
at Level 3 (0.36) and highest at Level 7 (0.70).186 
The principal purpose of Figure 2 is to test for race disparities after 
adjustment for the strike-proneness measure. We did this by calculating the 
disparities overall and within each level of the strike-proneness scale. For 
example, at strike-proneness Level 5, we see an overall strike rate of 0.42 (in 
the parenthetical), a strike rate of 0.71 for the black venire members, and a 
strike rate of 0.21 for the non-black venire members. This represents a 50-
percentage point disparity (0.71–0.21) and a black/non-black strike-rate 
ratio of 3.4 (0.71/0.21) both of which are statistically significant at the 
0.0001 level. Note that with one exception, there is a substantial and 
significant race disparity at every level of the strike-proneness scale. The one 
 
 186. The proportions of black venire members at each level of the scale are not reported in 
Figure 2. The correlation between the scale values and venire-member race is 0.23, significant 
at the 0.0001 level. 
.26
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.80
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exception is Level 7 where the strike-rate disparity is only 8-percentage 
points and not statistically significant. If facially neutral case characteristics 
explained the systemic race disparities in Prosecutor McMahon’s use of 
peremptory strikes, we would see a similar suppression of the race disparities 
at each level of the strike-proneness scale. Clearly we do not. Moreover, the 
overall race disparity adjusted for strike-proneness based on facially neutral 
venire-member characteristics is substantial—50 percentage points (0.64–
0.14) and a ratio of 4.6 (0.64/0.14), significant at the 0.0001 level. 
The statistical evidence presented in Wilson—unadjusted strike 
disparities, adjusted disparities after controlling for individual race-neutral 
characteristics, disparities after conducting fully controlled analyses with 
logistic regression, and possibly creating strike-proneness scales to enhance 
the analysis as well as the accessibility of the findings—provides an example 
of effective pattern-and-practice evidence. The study design and the 
evidence presented in the case are consistent with the model advanced in 
the Miller-El line of cases. It also provides guidance for future cases. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
On January 17, 2003, Judge Temin ruled that race had been a 
motivating factor in one or more of McMahon’s peremptory strikes and 
granted a new trial.187 The Commonwealth did not appeal Judge Temin’s 
ruling. On retrial, Wilson successfully moved to bar the death penalty 
because the delay associated with the prosecution’s violation of his 
constitutional rights prevented him from meaningfully developing and 
presenting his case for life. He was acquitted of all charges after DNA testing 
of blood on the killer’s jacket disclosed four sources: the three murder 
victims and a fourth person who was neither Wilson nor one of the victims. 
The Miller-El line of cases support the use of statistical evidence like that 
presented in Wilson. The Court has provided useful guidance and has 
endorsed reference to Title VII cases for support. More rigorous and precise 
use of statistical evidence in Batson claims may increase the Batson 
effectiveness, after only twenty-five years of delay. 
 
 
 187. “Mr. Wilson is entitled to a new trial because of the Commonwealth’s violation of . . . 
Batson. The court finds that there was definitely an attempt on the part of the Commonwealth 
to [peremptorily strike] jurors because of their African-American race, [and] that the neutral 
reasons given were not satisfactory. It was obvious in light of cross-examination that White jurors 
were accepted on the same basis on which Black jurors had been peremptorily challenged and, 
therefore, I find that the reasons given were pretextual and [a] new trial must be granted.” Post-
Conviction Relief Act Transcript 1/17/03, at 2, Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, July Term, 
1988, No. 3267, 3270, 3271 (Phila. C. P., Crim. Div.). In an earlier ruling, Judge Temin had 
ordered a new penalty trial because of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to investigate and 
present available mitigating evidence. Commonwealth v. Harold Wilson, Nos. 3267, 3270, 3271 
(Phila. C. P., Crim. Div., Jan. 31, 2000). 
